Decisions among the Undecided: Implicit Attitudes Predict Future Voting Behavior of Undecided Voters by Lundberg, Kristjen B. & Payne, B. Keith
Decisions among the Undecided: Implicit Attitudes
Predict Future Voting Behavior of Undecided Voters
Kristjen B. Lundberg*, B. Keith Payne
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America
Abstract
Implicit attitudes have been suggested as a key to unlock the hidden preferences of undecided voters. Past research,
however, offered mixed support for this hypothesis. The present research used a large nationally representative sample and
a longitudinal design to examine the predictive utility of implicit and explicit attitude measures in the 2008 U.S. presidential
election. In our analyses, explicit attitudes toward candidates predicted voting better for decided than undecided voters,
but implicit candidate attitudes were predictive of voting for both decided and undecided voters. Extending our
examination to implicit and explicit racial attitudes, we found the same pattern. Taken together, these results provide
convergent evidence that implicit attitudes predict voting about as well for undecided as for decided voters. We also
assessed a novel explanation for these effects by evaluating whether implicit attitudes may predict the choices of
undecided voters, in part, because they are neglected when people introspect about their confidence. Consistent with this
idea, we found that the extremity of explicit but not implicit attitudes was associated with greater confidence. These
analyses shed new light on the utility of implicit measures in predicting future behavior among individuals who feel
undecided. Considering the prior studies together with this new evidence, the data seem to be consistent that implicit
attitudes may be successful in predicting the behavior of undecided voters.
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Introduction
What does it mean when someone says they are undecided
about how to vote just weeks before an important election? Do
undecided voters truly have no clear preferences? Do they have
preferences, but are still weighing all the information at hand? Or,
do they simply lack conscious insight into what their preferences
are? Regardless, undecided voters are hard to ignore. Less than
two months before the 2012 U.S. presidential election, five percent
of voters in swing states were undecided, and another 17% said
they might change their minds [1]. These percentages are more
than enough to decide most elections, making the prediction of
undecided voters’ behavior an important problem for pollsters and
social scientists. Is it possible to predict the behavior of individuals
who cannot predict their own?
Psychologists have recently suggested an innovative solution to
this problem. Galdi, Arcuri, and Gawronski [2] proposed that a
key to predicting the behavior of undecided voters lies in the
distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes. Explicit
attitudes are evaluations of topics that are consciously endorsed
and voluntarily reported. Traditional self-report surveys, including
the questions asked in polls, measure explicit attitudes. In contrast,
implicit attitudes are spontaneous evaluations that are automat-
ically evoked when encountering or contemplating an issue.
Implicit evaluations come to mind whether or not they are
endorsed as true. They may affect behavior even when their
influence is unwanted.
Galdi and colleagues [2] proposed that explicit attitudes are
stronger predictors of behavior for decided voters than undecided
voters, but implicit attitudes are stronger predictors for undecided
voters than decided voters. They reasoned that implicit attitudes
may indirectly influence future voting behavior by biasing the
processing of decision-relevant information. To the extent that
people use this biased set of information in making a deliberate
decision, implicit attitudes may predict eventual decisions even
though respondents are undecided when the implicit attitudes are
measured. Evidence for this hypothesis was reported by Galdi,
Gawronski, Arcuri, and Friese [3], who demonstrated that the
implicit attitudes of undecided participants predicted selective
exposure to information consistent with their implicit attitudes.
Individuals who describe themselves as undecided may therefore
have implicit attitudes that will ultimately lead to conscious
preferences, but have not yet done so (see also [4]).
There is additional reason to believe that implicit attitudes may
predict behavior for undecided voters: Being ‘‘decided’’ or
‘‘undecided’’ is a metacognitive judgment that people make about
their own decision processes. Models of explicit and implicit
attitudes suggest that people are more likely to consider their
explicit attitudes to be a valid basis for judgment [5,6]. Whereas
explicit attitudes are experienced as conscious preferences or
‘‘considered opinions,’’ implicit attitudes tend to be experienced as
‘‘gut feelings’’ [5,7]. Further, those who consider their automatic
associations to be a less valid source of information have been
shown to exhibit weaker correspondences between explicit and
implicit measures [8,9,10,11].
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We suggest that, when people indicate whether they have
decided, they are more likely to base this judgment on their
consciously endorsed (i.e., explicit) attitudes than on implicit
attitudes. If explicit attitudes strongly favor one option over the
other, then the respondent will claim to be decided, whereas if the
explicit attitude is weak, unclear, or ambivalent, then the
respondent will claim to be undecided. Based on this reasoning,
explicit attitudes should be more predictive of behavior among
decided voters than undecided voters. Introspection, however,
may overlook implicit attitudes, especially if those implicit attitudes
are considered a less trustworthy source of information by default.
If so, then when people introspect about whether they have
decided, they may focus on consciously endorsed attitudes and
neglect implicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes would nonetheless be
automatically activated and would still have the potential to
influence behavior. Based on this introspective neglect hypothesis,
implicit attitudes should be equally predictive of behavior among
the decided and the undecided.
The introspective neglect account and the biased processing
account make different predictions about whether implicit
attitudes should predict behavior for decided voters after explicit
attitudes have been accounted for. Under the biased processing
account, implicit attitudes lead to deliberate decisions only
indirectly, by biasing the formation of the deliberate decision.
Once the biased information search has led to a deliberate
decision, no direct effect of implicit attitudes is predicted over and
above the effects of explicit attitudes. Both accounts thus predict
that implicit attitudes should predict decisions among the
undecided, but only the introspective neglect account predicts
that implicit attitudes should be similarly predictive among
decided voters after removing the effects of explicit attitudes.
Do Implicit Attitudes Predict Future Behavior of
Undecided Voters?
The theoretical reasons that implicit attitudes might predict the
behavior of undecided voters are clear, but the empirical evidence
to date has been mixed. In this section, we review the results of the
most relevant previous studies. One study by Arcuri and
colleagues [12] examined implicit political attitudes in the 2001
Italian general election. This study found that implicit attitudes
predicted voting intentions for both decided and undecided voters,
consistent with the idea that voters neglect implicit attitudes when
they assess whether they are decided. Based on this finding,
implicit attitude measures should be useful in predicting the
behavior of undecided voters even if the voters themselves do not
yet know how they will vote. However, this study did not
simultaneously account for explicit measures and, therefore,
cannot speak to the unique predictive power of implicit measures.
A second study by Galdi and colleagues [2] compared implicit
and explicit attitudes toward a politically charged issue in an
Italian sample. In separate analyses for decided and undecided
participants, this study found that explicit, but not implicit,
attitudes were predictive of future choices among decided
participants. In contrast, implicit, but not explicit, attitudes were
predictive of future choices among undecided participants. This
pattern suggests that voters rely on explicit attitudes when assessing
whether they have decided, but when they are undecided they rely
more on implicit attitudes. These analyses, too, suggest that
implicit attitude measures should be especially useful in predicting
the behavior of undecided voters. However, in multiple regression
analyses that treated decidedness as a dummy-coded moderator
variable, explicit attitudes were not moderated by confidence in
predicting future choices, while implicit attitudes were. While this
finding corroborates the account that implicit attitudes may be
more predictive for undecided than decided voters, it also suggests
that explicit attitudes may be equally predictive for both decided
and undecided voters.
Finally, Friese and colleagues [13] examined the ability of
implicit and explicit attitude measures to predict voting behavior
in the 2008 presidential election in the United States and the 2009
parliamentary election in Germany. Across three sets of multiple
regression analyses that treated decidedness as a moderator
variable and examined implicit attitude measures separately,
implicit attitudes were consistently predictive of voting behavior,
and they were more predictive for decided than undecided
respondents (in contrast to Galdi et al.’s [2] findings). However,
the variance due to explicit attitudes and their interaction with
decidedness was not removed in these analyses. Because explicit
and implicit attitudes were strongly correlated in these samples (rs
between .52 and .72), implicit attitudes may have spuriously
appeared to be more predictive among decided than undecided
voters because of the shared variance with explicit attitudes.
Indeed, once explicit attitudes were added as predictors to the
models, a different pattern emerged: In Study 1 (as reported in
their Table 3), explicit attitudes toward U.S. presidential
candidates were more predictive for decided than undecided
voters, but implicit attitudes were no longer a significant predictor
of the vote. In Study 2 (as reported in their Table 7), explicit
attitudes toward German parliamentary candidates were more
predictive for decided than undecided voters, while implicit
attitudes were predictive of voting for both decided and undecided
voters. Finally, a second analysis in Study 2 (as reported in their
Table 5) examined explicit and implicit attitudes toward political
camps rather than candidates. In this case, both explicit and
implicit attitudes were predictive of voting for both decided and
undecided voters.
Taken together, two out of the three critical analyses in Friese et
al. [13] suggest that explicit attitudes may be more predictive for
decided than undecided voters. Implicit attitudes were equally
predictive for decided and undecided voters in all three analyses,
but the effects of implicit attitudes were small in all analyses and
non-significant in one. It was these small effects of implicit
attitudes that led Friese and colleagues to question the utility of
implicit measures in forecasting behavior among the undecided.
The Present Research
In this study we re-examine the roles of implicit and explicit
attitudes in predicting voting behavior among decided and
undecided voters. Like Friese and colleagues [13], we studied
actual voting behavior in a major national election (the 2008 U.S.
presidential election). Whereas previous studies used convenience
samples or opt-in samples, ours is the first to address these
questions using a large nationally representative sample. We began
our re-examination of the findings of previous studies [2,12,13] by
modeling the relationships between implicit and explicit attitudes
toward the presidential candidates, decidedness, and voting
behavior (Analysis 1).
Our study provided a second opportunity to test the relation-
ships of interest by examining implicit and explicit racial attitudes
(Analysis 2). The nomination of Barack Obama in 2008 offered an
unprecedented occasion to study the role of implicit and explicit
racial attitudes in voting for a Black presidential candidate. We
replicated the analyses of candidate attitudes using these racial
attitude measures and explored for the first time whether implicit
and explicit racial prejudice predicted voting differently for
decided versus undecided voters.
Finally, we tested a hypothesis implied by the introspective
neglect account (Analysis 3). If metacognitions about whether one
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has decided are based on explicit but not implicit attitudes, then
more extreme explicit attitudes should be associated with greater
confidence. This explanation predicts a curvilinear relationship
between explicit attitudes and confidence, with more extreme
attitudes in favor of either voting option associated with high
confidence. Such a curvilinear relationship between confidence
and implicit attitudes is expected to be smaller or absent if implicit
attitudes are neglected during introspection.
Our study used different measures of implicit attitudes and
decidedness than previous studies. Whereas previous studies
[2,12,13] measured implicit attitudes using the Implicit Associa-
tion Test (IAT) [14], our study uses the Affect Misattribution
Procedure (AMP) [15]. Although the IAT and the AMP are both
well validated implicit measures, past research has generally found
the two measures to be only weakly correlated [16,17]. This may
be, first, because the AMP measures affective responses to the
stimuli presented as primes whereas the IAT is more likely to
measure associations to the category labels. Second, the mecha-
nism driving the AMP is assumed to be a misattribution of affect
from the prime to the target, whereas the mechanism driving the
IAT is assumed to be response interference. A third difference is
that the measure of interest in the AMP is an evaluation, whereas
in the IAT it is response times. Thus, the two measures are likely to
differ for both psychological and technical reasons.
Additionally, the previous studies we reviewed measured
decidedness with a binary measure in which respondents classified
themselves as decided or undecided [2,12,13]. Our study utilized a
continuous measure of confidence in one’s vote. The two measures
differ in that our item did not allow subjects to make the
determination of whether they considered themselves to have
decided. With a binary measure, two respondents with identical
levels of confidence may classify themselves differently if they
apply different thresholds. The continuous measure of confidence
avoids the threshold problem and may, therefore, provide a more
precise measure of how strongly participants feel about their
decision.
The difference in measures across studies suggests that our
results may not be directly comparable to existing findings, and the
results should not be interpreted as a direct replication attempt.
Nonetheless, the underlying psychological questions that we are
addressing are the same. These new data are well positioned to
provide additional evidence on the important question of whether
(and why) implicit attitudes may be effective predictors of decisions
among respondents who are as yet undecided.
In summary, the present study tested (1) whether implicit
attitudes toward Barack Obama and John McCain predicted
voting among undecided voters, (2) whether implicit racial
attitudes predicted voting among undecided voters, and (3)
whether confidence in voting decisions was more strongly
associated with the strength of explicit than implicit attitudes.
Together, these data shed new light on the utility of implicit
measures in predicting decisions among the undecided.
Respondents and sampling. In all analyses described, we
used data from the American National Election Studies (ANES)
2008–2009 Panel Study. For this study, panel respondents were
recruited by telephone using random digit dialing to participate in
an Internet-based study. Individuals who lacked a computer or
Internet access at home were provided them at no cost.
Respondents were compensated for completing monthly Internet
surveys from January 2008 through August 2009. All analyses
utilized sampling weights in order to correct for unequal
probabilities of selection and nonresponse bias, as well as the
Taylor Series method of calculating sampling errors and
conducting significance testing in order to account for the
clustering of the sample. These design-consistent estimation
procedures allow us to generalize our findings to the American
electorate. For additional information on the panel study, its
sampling and recruitment techniques, and its procedures for the
calculation of weights, please see DeBell, Krosnick, and Lupia
[18].
Ethics statement. Data collection for the ANES 2008–2009
Panel Study was performed by Knowledge Networks, Inc., under a
contract with Stanford University and with approval from the
Stanford University Institutional Review Board (IRB). Knowledge
Networks conforms to the Code of Standards and Ethics for
Survey Research of the Council of American Survey Research
Organizations, and all participants provided informed consent
prior to participation. Additionally, the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill Non-Biomedical IRB determined this
research to be exempt from review for human subjects research
(#08-0805).
Analysis 1
In this first analysis, we began our re-examination of the role of
implicit attitudes among undecided voters by predicting voting
behavior from implicit and explicit attitudes toward the presiden-
tial candidates.
Measures
Implicit candidate preference. Implicit candidate prefer-
ence was measured using the Affect Misattribution Procedure
(AMP) [15]. The measure was administered in either September
or October 2008 (date of completion was determined randomly for
each respondent). Participants completed 48 trials, each of which
began by presenting a fixation cue, followed by a photograph of
either Barack Obama or John McCain presented for 75 ms,
followed by the appearance of a randomly assigned Chinese
ideograph for 250 ms. Finally, the ideograph was replaced by a
visual mask composed of black and white dots in a random ‘‘noise’’
pattern. The mask remained on the screen until a response was
made. Respondents were instructed to judge whether each
ideograph was pleasant or unpleasant while avoiding influence
from the photographs. Unintentional influence of the primes on
judgments can be used to measure attitudes toward the candidates
pictured. Previous research has shown that the procedure is a
reliable and valid measure of implicit attitudes [15,19,20]. Implicit
candidate preference was calculated by subtracting the proportion
of pleasant judgments that followed photographs of Mr. McCain
from the proportion of pleasant judgments that followed photo-
graphs of Mr. Obama (a = .95). Higher scores indicate a greater
implicit preference for Mr. Obama.
Explicit candidate preference. Explicit candidate prefer-
ence was measured using two items assessing liking for Mr. Obama
and Mr. McCain. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent
to which they liked each candidate in a branching question (‘‘Do
you like John McCain [Barack Obama], dislike him, or neither
like nor dislike him?’’; then ‘‘Do you (dis)like him a great deal, a
moderate amount, or a little?’’). Liking for Mr. McCain was
subtracted from liking for Mr. Obama, such that higher scores
indicate a greater explicit preference for Mr. Obama. Explicit
attitude measures were collected during the same survey wave as
the implicit attitude measure.
Confidence regarding one’s voting intention. To assess
whether respondents had decided about their vote, respondents
were first asked for whom they thought they would vote in the
election for president. After answering, they were then asked:
‘‘How sure are you of that?’’ Responses were made on a 5-point
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scale from ‘‘extremely sure’’ to ‘‘not sure at all.’’ We scored the
item such that higher scores indicate greater confidence in one’s
voting intention. Confidence was measured in the same wave as
that in which the attitude measures were collected.
Voting behavior. Respondents were surveyed in November
after the election and were asked to report whether they voted for
president and, if so, for whom they had voted. For our analyses,
responses were scored such that 0 indicated a vote for Mr. McCain
and 1 indicated a vote for Mr. Obama. All other responses (i.e.,
those who did not vote for president or voted for a third-party
candidate) were not included in our analyses.
Results
Of those respondents who completed all measures of interest
(N = 2,013), 52.5% indicated a vote for Mr. Obama (47.5% for
Mr. McCain). Additionally, 60.2% indicated that they were
‘‘extremely sure,’’ 18.2% that they were ‘‘very sure,’’ 14.4% that
they were ‘‘moderately sure,’’ 4.1% that they were ‘‘slightly sure,’’
and 3.1% that they were ‘‘not sure at all.’’
For all analyses, continuous variables were standardized using z-
scores prior to analysis. Additionally, because respondents were
completing the predictors of interest in both September and
October 2008, a dummy variable indicating date of administration
was included in all analyses, coded as 0 (September 2008) and 1
(October 2008), but coefficients are reported only for the attitudes
and confidence variables that are of interest for the hypotheses
tested.
Model 1 in Table 1 features the results of a logistic regression
analysis predicting votes for Mr. Obama (versus Mr. McCain)
from explicit candidate attitudes and their interaction with
confidence. As expected, as explicit preference for Mr. Obama
increased, respondents were significantly more likely to vote for
Mr. Obama (B = 4.530, SE = .500, p,.001). The interaction
between confidence and explicit candidate preference also was
significant (B = 1.343, SE = .326, p,.001), indicating that explicit
attitudes were more predictive of voting behavior for those who
were more confident about how they would vote.
The second model in Table 1 shows a parallel logistic regression
analysis examining implicit attitudes. Respondents with greater
implicit preference for Mr. Obama were significantly more likely
to vote for him (B = 3.011, SE = .330, p,.001). Further, the
interaction between confidence and implicit candidate preference
was significant (B = .608, SE = .244, p = .013), and the effect was in
the same direction as for explicit attitudes. These results are
consistent with Friese et al.’s [13] finding that, when modeled
separately, both explicit and implicit attitudes were more
predictive of voting behavior for decided than for undecided
voters.
The results thus far examined explicit and implicit attitudes
separately. However, explicit and implicit candidate preferences
were highly correlated (r = .688, p,.001). As noted previously, this
shared variance between explicit and implicit attitudes makes it
important to investigate the unique effects of each measure when
the other is statistically controlled. The third model in Table 1
shows that explicit (B = 3.718, SE = .473, p,.001) and implicit
(B = 2.179, SE = .351, p,.001) candidate preferences each unique-
ly predicted voting.
Critically, the interaction between implicit candidate preference
and confidence became non-significant (B = .362, SE = .239,
p = .130). Implicit attitudes were predictive of voting behavior
across the range of confidence. Further, the interaction between
explicit candidate preference and confidence remained significant
(B = 1.215, SE = .324, p,.001), indicating that explicit attitudes
were more predictive of voting behavior at higher levels of
confidence. To illustrate the nature of these relationships between
attitudes and confidence, we calculated the simple slopes
(displayed in Figure 1) relating implicit and explicit candidate
preference to voting probabilities separately for respondents at
each of the five levels of confidence. As confidence decreased, the
predictive validity of explicit attitudes fell sharply, but the change
for implicit attitudes was slight and non-significant.
To further examine the significant interaction between explicit
attitudes and confidence, we tested the significance of those simple
slopes (reported in Table 2). For voters at the four highest levels of
confidence, explicit attitudes were a significant predictor of voting.
However, at the lowest level of confidence (i.e., ‘‘not sure at all’’),
explicit attitudes were no longer significantly associated with
voting. Though the simple slopes tests for implicit attitudes should
be interpreted with caution given that the interaction between
implicit attitudes and confidence was non-significant, it is clear
that implicit attitudes were a significant predictor of voting across
the full range of confidence ratings.
Table 1. Results of logistic regression analyses predicting voting behavior from explicit and implicit candidate preference and
confidence.
Model 1: Explicit Candidate Attitudes Model 2: Implicit Candidate Attitudes
Model 3: Explicit and Implicit Candidate
Attitudes
% CCC = 87.9 % CCC = 78.1 % CCC = 90.3
Variable B SE Wald p OR B SE Wald p OR B SE Wald p OR
Constant 0.258 0.195 1.749 0.186 1.294 0.247 0.114 4.693 0.303 1.280 0.382 0.220 3.011 0.083 1.466
Explicit Attitudes 4.530 0.500 82.202 ,.001 92.731 3.718 0.473 61.880 ,.001 41.197
Implicit Attitudes 3.011 0.330 83.109 ,.001 20.302 2.179 0.351 38.635 ,.001 8.834
Confidence 20.046 0.098 0.218 0.641 0.955 20.022 0.077 0.083 0.773 0.978 0.005 0.107 0.003 0.960 1.005
Explicit*Confidence 1.343 0.326 16.997 ,.001 3.830 1.215 0.324 14.050 ,.001 3.371
Implicit*Confidence 0.608 0.244 6.216 0.013 1.837 0.362 0.239 2.288 0.130 1.436
Predicting votes for Mr. Obama (1) versus Mr. McCain (0) from explicit and implicit preference for Mr. Obama (versus Mr. McCain) and their interaction with confidence.
Controlling for date of attitude measures administration. Model 1 examines explicit candidate attitudes separately (N = 2,058). Model 2 examines implicit candidate
attitudes separately (N = 2,013). Model 3 examines both attitude measures simultaneously (N = 2,013). CCC: correctly classified cases; B: regression weight B (log odds);
SE: standard error of the regression weight B; Wald: Wald test statistic; OR: Odds ratio. Relative amount by which the odds increase (OR .1.0) or decrease (OR ,1.0)
when the value of the predictor is increased by 1 SD.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085680.t001
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Further, at the two lowest levels of confidence, the simple odds
ratios for implicit attitudes were larger than those for explicit
attitudes. To provide a more concrete illustration of these effect
sizes, we will translate the predicted odds ratios into predicted
probabilities. For those at the lowest level of confidence (i.e., ‘‘not
sure at all’’ of their vote), the baseline probability of voting for Mr.
Obama was 0.591, which corresponds to an odds ratio of 1.443.
An increase of a single standard deviation in explicit preference for
Mr. Obama uniquely increased those odds by a factor of 1.222
(i.e., 1.44361.222 = 1.763), which translates to a probability of
0.638, while the same increase in implicit preference uniquely
increased those odds by a factor of 3.099 (i.e.,
1.44363.099 = 4.472), which translates to a probability of .817.
In short, ‘‘not sure at all’’ respondents who were one standard
deviation above the mean on explicit preference for Mr. Obama
had a predicted 64% chance of voting for him compared to the
predicted 59% chance for those at the mean, while those who were
one standard deviation above the mean on implicit preference had
a predicted 82% chance of voting for Mr. Obama. Similarly, for
those at the next lowest level of confidence (i.e., ‘‘slightly sure’’ of
their vote), increases of a single standard deviation in explicit
preference for Mr. Obama uniquely increased the chances of
voting for him from 59% to 84%, while the same increase in
implicit preference uniquely increased those chances to 86%. In
other words, among more undecided voters, implicit candidate
preference seemed to be a stronger predictor of voting behavior
than explicit candidate preference.
However, it also should be noted that, at lower levels of
confidence, despite the apparent differences in the magnitudes of
the implicit and explicit attitudes estimates, the 95% confidence
intervals for the pairs of estimates overlap substantially. For
example, the 95% confidence interval for the simple odds ratio for
the implicit candidate attitudes of ‘‘not sure at all’’ voters is 1.053
to 9.120, an interval which contains the simple odds ratio (1.222)
for the explicit candidate attitudes of those same voters. Given the
inappropriateness of calculating simple effects for implicit attitudes
in the absence of a significant interaction with confidence, we are
reluctant to draw firm conclusions regarding this finding.
Nonetheless, this result suggests that, for voters who are more
undecided, implicit and explicit attitudes are equally predictive of
voting behavior.
Controlling for party affiliation and political
ideology. In order to conduct a more conservative test, we
repeated the Model 3 analysis with the inclusion of two explicit
covariates: political party affiliation and political ideology. In
Friese et al.’s [13] Study 2, when an additional explicit indicator of
voting attitudes was included, all previously significant effects for
implicit measures became nonsignificant. However, in our
analysis, though both new covariates were significant predictors
of voting behavior (ps,.001), the same pattern of results still
emerged. Both explicit and implicit candidate preference were
significant predictors of voting behavior (ps,.001), and explicit
preference was moderated by confidence (p = .034), while implicit
preference was not (p = .399). Additional information regarding
these analyses is included in Table S1.
Summary of Analysis 1
To summarize, as voters became less sure of their vote, explicit
evaluations of the candidates became sharply less predictive of
eventual voting. Implicit attitudes remained a significant predictor
across the range of confidence, although the predictive effects of
implicit attitudes decreased slightly. At high levels of confidence,
explicit attitudes were a much stronger predictor of voting, but
both explicit and implicit attitudes predicted voting independently.
At low levels of confidence, implicit attitudes were slightly stronger
predictors than explicit attitudes.
Analysis 2
The same ANES data used for the candidate attitudes were also
used for the examination of racial attitudes. In the analyses that
follow, measures of voting behavior and confidence in the decision
were identical to the analyses of candidate preferences described
previously. Measures of confidence were selected from the wave
that corresponded with the date of AMP administration and, as
before, a control variable was included to indicate this factor.
Figure 1. Simple slopes relating candidate attitudes to voting for respondents at each of the five levels of confidence. Probability of
voting for Mr. Obama (1) versus Mr. McCain (0) as a function of candidate preference, confidence, and their interaction. Panel A: The association
between explicit candidate preference and voting was moderated by confidence. Panel B: The association between implicit candidate preference and
voting was not moderated by confidence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085680.g001
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Measures
Implicit prejudice. Implicit attitudes toward Blacks were
measured using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP).
Respondents completed the race AMP in either September or
October 2008. Those who completed the candidates AMP in
September completed the race AMP in October, and those who
completed the candidates AMP in October completed the race
AMP in September. The race AMP was administered according to
the same display parameters used in the candidates AMP.
Photographs of non-famous Black and White men, matched on
attractiveness and perceived typicality of their racial group, were
used as primes. Implicit prejudice was calculated by subtracting
the proportion of pleasant judgments that followed photographs of
Black individuals from the proportion of pleasant judgments that
followed photographs of White individuals (a = .77). Higher scores
indicate greater bias against Blacks (or in favor of Whites).
Explicit prejudice. We used all available explicit prejudice
items that were administered before the election. The items
included: (1) sympathy for Blacks, (2) admiration for Blacks, (3)
perceptions that Blacks have too much political influence, (4)
warm feelings toward Blacks, and (5) warm feelings toward Whites.
The first three items were collected in September and the two
feelings items were assessed in October. We subtracted the two
feelings items to create a relative preference for Whites versus
Blacks. All explicit items were then standardized and averaged into
a composite, with higher scores reflecting more negative attitudes
toward Blacks (a = .63).
Results
This sample differs only slightly from the one used in the
previous analysis. Of those respondents who completed all
measures of interest (N = 2,024), 52.9% indicated a vote for Mr.
Obama (47.1% for Mr. McCain). Additionally, 61.1% indicated
that they were ‘‘extremely sure,’’ 18.3% that they were ‘‘very
sure,’’ 13.0% that they were ‘‘moderately sure,’’ 4.1% that they
were ‘‘slightly sure,’’ and 3.5% that they were ‘‘not sure at all.’’
Explicit and implicit racial attitudes were modestly correlated
(r = .282, p,.001), consistent with prior research [19,21]. Table 3
presents the results of three binary logistic regression analyses
predicting votes for Mr. Obama versus Mr. McCain from explicit
and implicit racial attitudes and their interactions with confidence.
When explicit attitudes were modeled separately (Model 1),
respondents with more negative explicit attitudes toward Blacks
were significantly less likely to cast a vote for Mr. Obama
(B = 21.253, SE = .115, p,.001). Explicit attitudes also displayed a
significant interaction with confidence (B = 2.273, SE = .115,
p = .017), indicating that explicit prejudice was more predictive
of voting among decided voters than undecided voters.
When implicit attitudes were modeled separately (Model 2),
individuals higher in implicit prejudice were less likely to vote for
Mr. Obama (B = 2.417, SE = .067, p,.001). However, there was
no interaction between implicit attitudes and confidence
(B = 2.059, SE = .068, p = .388), indicating that implicit prejudice
was predictive of voting among both decided and undecided
voters. This finding replicates the results with implicit candidate
attitudes when the variance due to explicit attitudes was removed.
In the case of racial attitudes, implicit and explicit measures were
only modestly correlated, making the shared variance less
problematic. The next analysis examined the consequences of
controlling for explicit attitudes.
When implicit and explicit attitudes were modeled simulta-
neously (Model 3), both explicit attitudes (B = 21.212, SE = .120,
p,.001) and implicit attitudes (B = 2.250, SE = .077, p = .001)
uniquely predicted voting. The interaction between implicit
attitudes and confidence remained non-significant (B = .035,
SE = .075, p = .641), and the interaction between explicit attitudes
and confidence remained significant (B = 2.257, SE = .117,
p = .029). To illustrate the nature of these relationships between
prejudice and confidence, we plotted the simple slopes relating
implicit and explicit racial attitudes to voting probabilities
separately for respondents at each level of confidence (displayed
in Figure 2). Explicit prejudice had a larger overall predictive effect
than implicit attitudes. However, only explicit attitudes were
moderated by confidence.
Additionally, to examine further the significant interaction
between explicit prejudice and confidence, we tested the
significance of those simple slopes (Table 4). For voters at the
four highest levels of confidence, explicit prejudice was a
significant predictor of voting. However, at the lowest level of
confidence, explicit prejudice was not significantly associated with
voting. While the simple effects for implicit prejudice remain
weaker than those for explicit prejudice at each level of confidence,
they vary only slightly across the range of confidence (simple odds
ratios from .705 to .798), suggesting that implicit attitudes remain
a consistent predictor regardless of confidence level. (Simple slopes
for implicit attitudes should be interpreted with caution because
there was no significant interaction.) At lower levels of confidence,
the simple odds ratios for both explicit and implicit attitudes are
comparable (e.g., .624 for explicit versus .705 for implicit for those
who were ‘‘not sure at all’’).
As we did before in Analysis 1, we can provide a more concrete
illustration of the effect sizes by translating the predicted odds ratios
into predicted probabilities. For ‘‘not sure at all’’ voters in Model 3,
Table 2. Simple effects estimates for explicit and implicit candidate attitudes at each level of confidence.
Explicit Candidate Attitudes Implicit Candidate Attitudes
Confidence Level B p OR 95% CI B p OR 95% CI
Extremely sure 4.590 ,.001 98.477 27.965, 346.773 2.438 ,.001 11.451 4.507, 29.095
Very sure 3.493 ,.001 32.872 13.924, 77.606 2.111 ,.001 8.259 4.368, 15.618
Moderately sure 2.395 ,.001 10.971 5.228, 23.025 1.785 ,.001 5.957 3.443, 10.307
Slightly sure 1.298 0.012 3.662 1.334, 10.052 1.458 ,.001 4.297 2.042, 9.042
Not sure at all 0.201 0.788 1.222 0.282, 5.293 1.131 0.040 3.099 1.053, 9.120
Simple effects tests for predicted values of explicit and implicit candidate attitudes at each level of confidence. Corresponds to Model 3 in Table 1. B: regression weight B
(log odds); OR: Odds ratio. Relative amount by which the odds increase (OR .1.0) or decrease (OR ,1.0) when the value of the predictor is increased by 1 SD; 95% CI:
95% confidence interval for the odds ratio. Intervals that do not contain 1 are considered significant at p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085680.t002
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a single standard deviation increase in explicit prejudice uniquely
decreased the probability of voting for Mr. Obama from 56% to
44%, while a single standard deviation increase in implicit prejudice
decreased that probability to 47%. Similarly, for ‘‘slightly sure’’
voters, increases in explicit prejudice uniquely decreased the
probability of voting for Mr. Obama from 54% to 37%, while
increases in implicit prejudice decreased that probability to 46%. In
other words, among more undecided voters, explicit prejudice
seemed to be a stronger predictor of voting behavior than implicit
prejudice. However, it also should be noted that, at the lowest level
of confidence, despite the apparent difference in the magnitudes of
the implicit and explicit attitudes estimates, the 95% confidence
intervals for the pair of estimates overlap substantially, suggesting
that, for voters who are more undecided, implicit and explicit
attitudes are equally predictive of voting behavior.
Summary of Analysis 2
Together, the results of the racial attitudes analyses are
generally consistent with attitudes toward the candidates: Explicit
attitudes were more predictive of voting for decided than
undecided voters, but implicit attitudes were similarly predictive
for undecided and decided voters.
Analysis 3
One reason that implicit attitudes should predict behavior
among the undecided is that when people introspect about
whether they have reached a decision, they attend primarily to
consciously endorsed attitudes and neglect implicit attitudes. This
does not imply that implicit attitudes are necessarily unconscious,
but simply that people tend to consider them to be a less valid basis
for judgments [5,7]. To test the hypothesis more directly, we next
examined the relationships between attitude extremity and
confidence. We expected that more extreme explicit attitudes
would be associated with greater confidence in one’s vote, but that
this association would be weaker for implicit attitudes. Statistically,
this hypothesis predicts a curvilinear relationship between explicit
attitudes and confidence.
Table 3. Results of logistic regression analyses predicting voting behavior from explicit and implicit prejudice and confidence.
Model 1: Explicit Prejudice Model 2: Implicit Prejudice Model 3: Explicit and Implicit Prejudice
% CCC = 66.7 % CCC = 56.3 % CCC = 67.2
Variable B SE Wald p OR B SE Wald p OR B SE Wald p OR
Constant 0.044 0.088 0.251 0.617 1.045 20.011 0.085 0.015 0.901 0.989 0.025 0.091 0.075 0.784 1.025
Explicit Prejudice 21.253 0.115 119.818 ,.001 0.286 21.212 0.120 102.620 ,.001 0.298
Implicit Prejudice 20.417 0.067 39.286 ,.001 0.659 20.250 0.077 10.543 0.001 0.779
Confidence 20.071 0.069 1.073 0.300 0.931 20.021 0.064 0.112 0.738 0.979 20.073 0.069 1.103 0.294 0.930
Explicit*Confidence 20.273 0.115 5.670 0.017 0.761 20.257 0.117 4.795 0.029 0.774
Implicit*Confidence 20.059 0.068 0.746 0.388 0.943 0.035 0.075 0.217 0.641 1.035
Predicting votes for Mr. Obama (1) versus Mr. McCain (0) from explicit and implicit prejudice toward Blacks and their interactions with confidence. Controlling for date of
implicit attitude measure administration. Model 1 examines explicit prejudice separately (N = 2,056). Model 2 examines implicit prejudice separately (N = 2,024). Model 3
examines both prejudice measures simultaneously (N = 2,024). CCC: correctly classified cases; B: regression weight B (log odds); SE: standard error of the regression
weight B; Wald: Wald test statistic; OR: Odds ratio. Relative amount by which the odds increase (OR .1.0) or decrease (OR ,1.0) when the value of the predictor is
increased by 1 SD.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085680.t003
Figure 2. Simple slopes relating racial attitudes to voting for respondents at each of the five levels of confidence. Probability of voting
for Mr. Obama (1) versus Mr. McCain (0) as a function of racial attitudes, confidence, and their interaction. Panel A: The association between explicit
racial attitudes and voting was moderated by confidence. Panel B: The association between implicit racial attitudes and voting was not moderated by
confidence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085680.g002
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Candidate Attitudes
To test this hypothesis, we regressed confidence on explicit and
implicit candidate preferences and their quadratic terms (see
Figure 3, Panel A). While the linear effects for explicit attitudes
(B = .023, SE = .029, p = .428) and implicit attitudes (B = .001,
SE = .032, p = .985) were non-significant, both quadratic effects
were significant. More extreme explicit attitudes in favor of either
candidate were strongly associated with greater confidence
(B = .401, SE = .021, p,.001). A similar but much weaker
relationship was observed for implicit candidate attitudes
(B = .064, SE = .017, p,.001). Importantly, the 95% confidence
interval for explicit attitudes (.359 to .443) did not include the
coefficient for implicit attitudes, indicating that the quadratic term
for explicit attitudes was significantly greater than that for implicit
attitudes.
Racial Attitudes
We conducted a parallel analysis for racial attitudes (see
Figure 3, Panel B). The linear effect of explicit prejudice was
significant, indicating that higher explicit prejudice was slightly
associated with lower confidence (B = 2.142, SE = .036, p,.001).
More importantly, the quadratic effect of explicit attitudes was also
significant, indicating that more extreme racial attitudes (either
pro-Black or anti-Black) were associated with greater confidence in
one’s voting intention (B = .134, SE = .028, p,.001). For implicit
race attitudes, neither the linear effect (B = 2.021, SE = .027,
p = .437) nor the quadratic effect (B = .013, SE = .011, p = .227)
were significant.
Summary of Analysis 3
These analyses are consistent with the hypothesis that, when
people introspect about whether they have decided, they focus on
explicit attitudes. As a result, more extreme explicit attitudes are
associated with greater confidence. Implicit attitudes, in contrast,
may be overlooked when people assess whether they have reached
a confident decision, especially if they are considered a less trusted
or valid source of information. This asymmetry between explicit
and implicit attitudes provides new evidence for a potential
Table 4. Simple effects estimates for explicit and implicit racial attitudes at each level of confidence.
Explicit Racial Attitudes Implicit Racial Attitudes
Confidence Level B p OR 95% CI B p OR 95% CI
Extremely sure 21.392 ,.001 0.248 0.186, 0.332 20.225 0.015 0.798 0.666, 0.958
Very sure 21.162 ,.001 0.313 0.247, 0.397 20.256 0.001 0.774 0.664, 0.902
Moderately sure 20.932 ,.001 0.394 0.281, 0.552 20.287 0.010 0.750 0.602, 0.935
Slightly sure 20.702 0.007 0.496 0.299, 0.822 20.319 0.057 0.727 0.524, 1.009
Not sure at all 20.472 0.184 0.624 0.311, 1.251 20.350 0.126 0.705 0.450, 1.104
Simple effects tests for predicted values of explicit and implicit racial attitudes at each level of confidence. Corresponds to Model 3 in Table 3. B: regression weight B (log
odds); OR: Odds ratio. Relative amount by which the odds increase (OR .1.0) or decrease (OR ,1.0) when the value of the predictor is increased by 1 SD; 95% CI: 95%
confidence interval for the odds ratio. Intervals that do not contain 1 are considered significant at p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085680.t004
Figure 3. Quadratic relationships between confidence in one’s vote and explicit and implicit attitudes. Panel A: The quadratic
relationship between confidence and explicit candidate attitudes was larger than the quadratic relationship between confidence and implicit
candidate attitudes. Panel B: The quadratic relationship between confidence and explicit prejudice was larger than the quadratic relationship
between confidence and implicit prejudice.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085680.g003
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mechanism that may help explain why implicit attitudes predict
future behavior among undecided voters. If strong implicit
attitudes have significant effects on behavior but small effects on
assessments of confidence, then implicit attitudes should predict
behavior even among undecided voters.
General Discussion
The idea that implicit attitude measures can predict the
behavior of undecided voters has generated a great deal of
interest, because it suggests that precursors of decisions can be
detected before respondents feel they have made up their minds.
This idea has also generated some disagreement over whether and
when such effects might be expected, as some prior studies have
found implicit attitudes to predict voting among undecided voters
whereas others have not. We re-examined these ideas using a large
nationally representative sample and a longitudinal design, with
implicit measures of both candidate attitudes and racial attitudes.
We found that when implicit and explicit attitudes were highly
correlated, as in the case of attitudes toward political candidates,
the role of implicit attitudes depended critically on whether explicit
attitudes were statistically controlled. When explicit candidate
attitudes were not controlled, implicit candidate attitudes were
more predictive among decided than undecided voters. However,
this finding appears to result from the shared variance between
implicit and explicit candidate attitudes. When explicit candidate
attitudes were controlled, implicit candidate attitudes were equally
predictive for decided and undecided voters. The results for
candidate attitudes and racial attitudes both provided evidence
that implicit attitudes may predict the behaviors of voters who feel
that they have not made up their minds.
We also explored the hypothesis that implicit attitudes might
predict behavior even among the undecided because, when people
introspect, they attend to consciously endorsed attitudes and
neglect implicit attitudes. Consistent with this idea, we found that
more extreme explicit attitudes were associated with greater
confidence. This association suggests an explanation for why
explicit attitudes lost so much of their predictive power at lower
levels of confidence: Weaker explicit attitudes are both less
predictive of behavior and more likely to generate metacognitive
judgments of low confidence. The relationship between attitudes
extremity and confidence was much weaker for implicit attitudes.
We also found that this effect was much larger for candidate
attitudes than racial attitudes. This difference may result because,
when people assess their confidence in their vote, they are most
likely to introspect about their feelings toward the candidates.
However, the fact that a similar (albeit weaker) tendency was
found for explicit prejudice suggests that people may also have
consulted their explicit feelings toward Blacks in general.
This pattern may also be consistent with Galdi and colleagues’
[2,4] biased processing hypothesis. By that account, confidence
accrues to the extent that confirmatory evidence is available to
support one’s biased processing. Thus, the same biased processing
that leads to deliberate decisions may also lead to higher
confidence. If we had failed to find evidence that confidence was
more strongly associated with explicit than implicit attitudes, it
would have cast doubt on the introspective neglect hypothesis.
These curvilinear relationships offer positive support for the
introspective neglect hypothesis, but they do not distinguish
between that account and the biased processing account. Further,
though these results are suggestive, they do not provide direct
evidence for the causal mechanism presumed to underlie the
introspective neglect hypothesis, namely that implicit attitudes do
not factor into metacognitive judgments of decidedness because
they are considered a less valid source of information. Future
research should directly test this causal hypothesis.
Theoretical Significance
The present results shed light on an important asymmetry
between how explicit and implicit attitudes predict behavior. Some
perspectives suggest that implicit attitudes may only predict
behaviors that are spontaneous or difficult to control, whereas
explicit attitudes predict deliberate behavior [22]. Other authors
have pointed out that a number of different patterns have been
documented in the literature, including additive effects, indirect
effects, and interactive effects [23]. The present results are
consistent with both indirect effects and additive direct effects.
Indirect effects of implicit attitudes through explicit attitudes are
suggested by the fact that controlling for explicit attitudes reduced
the predictive effects of implicit attitudes. And yet, after controlling
for explicit attitudes, we found consistent unique effects of implicit
attitudes.
Both indirect and direct pathways are important for under-
standing the causal forces that shape voting and other political
behavior. Indirect pathways suggest that implicit attitudes
influence the thoughts and feelings that will eventually be explicitly
endorsed, through mechanisms such as biased processing of
confirmatory evidence [3]. Even when explicit attitudes are the
proximal cause, they may be the result of earlier implicit processes.
Indirect effects are potentially important evidence for the purpose
of understanding such causal chains. Direct effects are also
important, but they suggest different processes. For example,
prominent theoretical models suggest that highly accessible
attitudes may influence decisions by influencing how the options
are construed even if respondents are motivated to deny those
attitudes explicitly [24]. Such effects would appear in the present
data as a direct effect of implicit attitudes. Both direct and indirect
effects provide evidence toward understanding the multiple
pathways by which implicit and explicit attitudes may influence
consequential behavior.
Practical Significance
Do implicit measures add substantively to the ability to forecast
election outcomes? Explicit attitude measures are simpler and
easier to administer than implicit measures, so implicit measures
would have to show a non-trivial effect beyond explicit measures
to justify including them for some practical purposes. If we were
simply interested in whether implicit measures improve election
forecasts for all voters, then overall measures of goodness of fit can
provide us with the necessary information. For example, Table 1
shows one such measure of goodness of fit, the percentage of
correctly classified cases, for the analyses involving candidate
attitudes, while Table 3 shows the same information for the
analyses involving racial attitudes. In both sets of analyses, though
implicit attitudes are significant unique predictors of voting
behavior, the models including both explicit and implicit attitudes
(Models 3) do not improve substantially on the models including
just explicit attitudes (Models 1). The increase in the percentage of
correctly classified cases is 2.4% for candidate attitudes and just
0.5% for racial attitudes.
However, we are particularly interested in whether implicit
measures improve election forecasts for a subset of voters, those
who are less sure of their vote, to which these overall measures of
goodness of fit cannot speak. To better address this specific
question, we turn to a comparison of the model-implied simple
effects estimates for both explicit and implicit attitudes at lower
levels of confidence. (See Tables 2 and 4.) For candidate attitudes,
the greater magnitude and significance of the simple effects
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estimates for implicit attitudes compared to explicit attitudes
suggests that implicit attitudes may be more predictive than
explicit attitudes among voters who are more undecided.
However, the reverse is true of racial attitudes; in this case,
explicit attitudes may be more predictive than implicit attitudes
among voters who are more undecided. Further, in both sets of
analyses, the confidence intervals constructed around the simple
odds ratios lead to the conclusion that, at lower levels of
confidence, implicit and explicit attitudes are equally predictive
of voting behavior.
Overall, explicit attitudes were clearly substantial predictors of
the vote. Taking all these results together, we believe that the data
suggest that implicit and explicit attitudes are equally predictive for
less confident voters. Nonetheless, these conclusions are drawn
from models in which implicit measures showed substantial and
unique predictive power after controlling for explicit attitudes.
This is especially so among undecided voters, for whom explicit
measures lose some of their predictive power. Therefore, including
implicit measures in studies of voting behavior seems potentially
useful to election forecasters.
Relationship to Past Research
A close look at the results of Friese et al. [13] shows that, in the
three analyses in which they entered implicit and explicit attitudes
simultaneously (reported in their Tables 3, 5, and 7), the
interaction between implicit attitudes and decidedness was not
significant, consistent with the present results. Their interpreta-
tions differed from ours, however, because their study found that,
once explicit measures were included, implicit attitudes were not
consistently a significant predictor of voting. That is, in some
analyses they found that implicit attitudes predicted voting for
neither decided nor undecided voters after explicit attitudes were
controlled, whereas in other analyses they found significant but
small effects of implicit attitudes for both decided and undecided
voters. Overall, the qualitative pattern of results in the Friese et al.
study and ours is quite similar. The main difference is that we
found a consistent unique effect of implicit attitudes whereas they
found a less consistent effect.
Several procedural differences could potentially explain the
discrepancies between these studies. Both studies used large
samples, but only our sample was representative of the population.
The two studies used different implicit measures and different
measures of decidedness. Given these procedural differences, the
parallels between the conclusions are rather more striking than
their divergences. These explanations are necessarily speculative,
and future research should systematically compare procedures to
clarify the conditions under which implicit attitudes are most and
least predictive.
Our findings are consistent with the general proposal by Galdi
and colleagues [2] that implicit attitudes may be valuable for
predicting the behavior of undecided voters. Our findings were not
entirely consistent, however, with the particulars of Galdi et al.’s
hypothesis or with the mechanism that they proposed. Firstly, the
two predictions that can be derived from Galdi et al.’s original
work are (1) that implicit attitudes are more predictive of voting
behavior than explicit attitudes for undecided voters; and (2) that
implicit attitudes are more predictive of voting behavior for
undecided than decided voters. On the first point, our analyses do
not firmly support that conclusion. In fact, the body of evidence
suggests only that implicit and explicit attitudes are equally
predictive of voting behavior for voters who are more undecided.
Further, our findings do not support the second point: In our
analyses, the nonsignificant interactions between implicit attitudes
and confidence indicate instead that implicit attitudes are equally
predictive of voting behavior for voters who are more or less
decided.
Further, Galdi and colleagues’ [2,4] biased processing account
implies that implicit attitudes only affect deliberate decisions
indirectly, through the biased processing of subsequent informa-
tion. By the time a person has gathered enough confirmatory
evidence to feel confident in their decision, there should be no
direct effect of implicit attitudes after controlling for the effects of
explicit attitudes. This account thus predicts no unique effect of
implicit attitudes among decided voters. However, we found that
implicit attitudes were predictive among both decided and
undecided voters and that, if anything, their effects were slightly
stronger among decided voters. This pattern is consistent with the
hypothesis that people neglect implicit attitudes and focus on
explicitly endorsed attitudes when they introspect about their
confidence in decisions. Our findings do not rule out the
hypothesis that biased processing contributes to the downstream
effects of implicit attitudes. Both biased processing and introspec-
tive asymmetries may play a role in explaining why implicit
attitudes interact with confidence differently than explicit attitudes.
Earlier research analyzed the racial attitudes data from the
ANES and found that explicit and implicit racial attitudes each
uniquely predicted voting, although the effects of explicit prejudice
were larger [25,26]. Two recent papers re-examined the role of
implicit prejudice in the ANES data and concluded that, whereas
the effects of explicit prejudice were large and important, the
unique influence of implicit prejudice was not large enough to be
politically consequential [27,28]. None of these previous studies,
however, considered whether voters were decided.
The present study suggests an interesting new perspective on the
relative impact of implicit and explicit attitudes. By the time
implicit attitudes were measured in the ANES (September–
October), most respondents had reached a confident decision.
The analyses in the present article suggest that the relative
importance of explicit and implicit attitudes will depend on the
proportion of the population who has reached a firm decision.
Though one conclusion may be that explicit prejudice is generally
more consequential for voting, an alternative hypothesis is that,
when undecided voters are included in greater numbers, the
relative effect size of implicit attitudes should increase. Future
research should test this hypothesis by measuring implicit and
explicit attitudes earlier in elections when fewer respondents have
reached decisions.
Conclusion
Implicit attitudes have been suggested as a key to unlock the
hidden preferences of undecided voters. Past research, however,
offered mixed support for this hypothesis. The present research
found that, when the influence of explicit attitudes was controlled,
implicit attitudes predicted voting as well for the undecided as for
the decided voters. Implicit tests may offer a useful tool in
forecasting elections, especially at early stages when many voters
have yet to make up their minds.
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